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Abstract
The nature of empirical simplicity and its relationship to scientific truth are long-standing puzzles. In this paper, empirical
simplicity is explicated in terms of empirical effects, which are defined in terms of the structure of the inference problem addressed.
Problem instances are classified according to the number of empirical effects they present. Simple answers are satisfied by simple
worlds. An efficient solution achieves the optimum worst-case cost over each complexity class with respect to such costs as
the number of retractions or errors prior to convergence and elapsed time to convergence. It is shown that always choosing the
simplest theory compatible with experience and hanging on to it while it remains the simplest is both necessary and sufficient for
efficiency.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. The simplicity puzzle
Machine learning, statistics, and the philosophy of science all recommend the selection of simple theories or
models on the basis of empirical data, where simplicity has something to do with minimizing independent entities,
principles, causes, or equational coefficients. This intuitive preference for simplicity is called Ockham’s razor, after
the fourteenth century theologian and logician William of Ockham, whose work exemplified a similar tendency. But
in spite of its intuitive appeal, how could Ockham’s razor possibly help us find the true theory? For if we already
know that the simplest theory is true or probably true, we don’t need Ockham’s razor to infer that it is. And if we
don’t know that the simplest theory is true or probably true, how do we know that simplicity steers us in the right
direction?
It doesn’t help to say that simplicity is associated with other virtues such as testability [24], unity [7], better
explanations [14], higher “confirmation” [3,13], minimization of predictive risk [2], or minimum description length
[31], since if the truth weren’t simple, it wouldn’t have these nice properties either. To assume otherwise is to engage
in wishful thinking [30].
Over-fitting arguments based upon minimization of predictive risk might seem to be an exception (cf.
Wasserman [32], Mitchell [23], Forster and Sober [8]). Such arguments show that using a complex model for predictive
purposes in the presence of random noise can increase the expected deviation from the truth of estimates based upon
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the complex model.1 But that is no less true when you know in advance that the truth is complex, so over-fitting
arguments concern accuracy of prediction rather than theoretical truth.2
Nor is Ockham’s razor explained by a prior probabilistic bias in favor of simple possibilities, for the propriety of
a systematic bias in favor of simplicity is precisely what is at issue.3 Simulation studies, in which simplicity-biased
methods are applied to problems randomly generated according to a simplicity-biased sampling distribution over
problem instances, are circular in precisely the same way.
There are non-circular, relevant arguments for Ockham’s razor, if one is willing to grant speculative premises.
Leibniz [21] appealed to the Creator’s taste for elegance. More recently, some philosophers and even some machine
learning texts have replaced Providence with an equally benevolent, evolutionary etiology.
Why should one prefer simpler hypotheses? . . . If the species of agents employs a learning algorithm whose
inductive bias is Occam’s razor, then we expect evolution to produce internal representations for which
Occam’s razor is a successful strategy. The essence of the argument here is that evolution will create internal
representations that make the learning algorithm’s inductive bias a self-fulfilling prophecy, simply because it
can alter the representation easier than it can alter the learning algorithm (Mitchell [23], p. 66; cf. also Duda
et al. [5], pp. 464–465).
Maybe. But even if the adaptationist story is true, it explains the truth-finding efficacy of Ockham’s razor only in
dealings with matters of pre-historic survival. How does simplicity continue to track the truth in the vastly expanded
linguistic and experiential realm of contemporary science? To respond that what was successful in prehistorical
applications will continue to succeed in future situations is an appeal to the uniformity (simplicity) of experience
and, hence, to Ockham’s razor, which is another example of circular reasoning.
Circularity aside, it is awkward for computer scientists to find themselves pressed to the extremity of
paleontological arguments on behalf of the most recent machine learning procedures. One routinely expects computer
scientists to justify a procedure by demonstrating its efficiency at finding the right answer, whatever the right answer
might be (e.g., Aho et al. [1], Garey and Johnson [10]). Even if Providence or evolution does arrange the truth of
simple theories in a way that we can never know without begging the question, it would surely be nice, in addition,
to have a clear, mathematical argument to the effect that Ockham’s razor is the most efficient possible method for
finding the true theory when the problem involves theory choice. This paper presents such an argument.4 The idea is
that it is hopeless to provide an a priori explanation how simplicity points at the truth immediately, since the truth may
depend upon subtle empirical effects that have not yet been observed or even conceived of. The best that Ockham’s
razor could be hoped to achieve is to keep us on the straightest possible path to the truth, allowing for unavoidable
twists and turns along the way as new effects are discovered—and that is just what it is shown to do. The argument is
presented first for a particular example and is then generalized to a broad class of possible inference problems.
2. Empirical effects
Suppose that you are interested in the form of an unknown polynomial law
1 Deviation is measured, for example, in terms of Kullback–Leibler divergence and the estimates based upon the model are maximum likelihood
estimates. It false that the standard methods of model selection in any sense minimize worst-case expected distance of maximum likelihood
estimates from the truth; they merely minimize an unbiased, empirical estimate of that distance.
2 Often, the former is practically “good enough”, but not always, as when one is learning how to intervene in a causal system from
non-experimental data [28]. In such applications, causal theories with arbitrarily good predictive ability can lead to arbitrarily bad policy
recommendations because arbitrarily small correlations can indicate reversals in causal order among the variables [29].
3 Some standard Bayesian prior probabilities in machine learning (e.g., the prior probability whose posterior is approximated by the Bayes’
information criterion or BIC; cf. Wasserman [32].) impose equal prior probabilities on all answers, whether they be simple or complex. But
imposing equal probabilities on answers implies a strong bias against complex possible worlds (parameter settings), since the parameter space of
the complex theory has a higher dimension than that of the simple theory and the distribution over parameters is usually assumed to be flat. If the
simple theory happens to explain the data accurately, then the complex theory does so only over a narrow interval of its parameters, which carries
very low prior probability compared to the simple theory, because the prior probability of the complex theory is spread uniformly over its possible
parameter values. Updating the probabilities of the two theories by Bayes’ theorem simply passes along the prior bias in favor of the best-fitting
settings of the parameters in the simple theory over the best-fitting settings of the parameters in the complex theory, so the argument is still circular
when both theories are assigned equal prior probabilities.
4 The approach is based on concepts from computational learning theory. For a survey of related ideas, cf. Jain et al. [15] and Kelly [16].
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f (x) =
n∑
i=0
ai x i .
It seems that laws involving fewer monomial terms are simpler, so Ockham’s razor favors them. Suppose that patience
and improvements in measurement technology allow one to obtain ever tighter open intervals around f (x) for each
specified value of x as time progresses.5 Suppose that the true degree is zero, so that f is a constant function. Each
finite collection of open intervals around values of f is compatible with degree one (linearity), since there is always
a bit of wiggle room within finitely many open intervals to tilt the line. So suppose that the truth is a tilted line that
fits the data received so far. Eventually you can obtain data from this line that refutes degree zero. Call such data a
(first-order) effect. Any finite amount of data collected for the linear theory is compatible (due to the remaining wiggle
room) with a quadratic law. Further data collected from the quadratic law eventually refutes linearity (a second-order
effect), and so forth. The truth is assumed to be polynomial, so the story must end, eventually, at some finite set
A of effects. Thus, determining the true polynomial law amounts, essentially, to determining the finite set A of all
monomial effects that one will ever see.
So conceived, empirical effects have the property that they never appear if they don’t exist, but may appear
arbitrarily late if they do exist. To reduce the curve-fitting problem to its essential elements, let E be a denumerable set
of potential effects and assume that at most finitely many of these effects will ever occur. Assume that your lab merely
reports the finite set of effects that have been detected so far, so a world or input stream is an infinite, increasing,
sequence of finite subsets of E that converges to some finite subset of E . Let K denote the set of all such worlds. If
w ∈ K , then let w|n denote the initial segment of w of length n. Then the set of all finite input sequences compatible
with K is given by:
Kfin = {w|n : w ∈ K and n ∈ ω}.
Given s, s′ ∈ K ∪ Kfin, let s ≤ s′ indicate that s is an initial segment of s′, and let s ⊆ s′ indicate that s is a
sub-sequence of s′ (not necessarily an initial segment). Then < and ⊂ denote the strict versions of these respective
relations. If e ∈ Kfin, then the set of all worlds in K compatible with e is given by:
Ke = {w ∈ K : e < w}.
Let s ∈ K ∪ Kfin. Then let the effects presented in s be defined by:
(s) =
⋃
i∈dom(s)
s(i).
Let TA denote the proposition that A is the set of all effects that one will ever see:
TA = {w ∈ K : (w) = A}.
Then the true answer to the effect accounting problem in world w is just T(w), and the potential answers are given
by the partition of K :
Π = {T(w) : w ∈ K }.
Let the effect accounting problem be the pair (K ,Π ), where K is the problem’s presupposition and Π is the question
posed by the problem. The effect accounting problem captures the essential character of a number of natural inference
problems, such as determining the set of independent variables a dependent variable depends upon, determining
quantum numbers from a set of reactions [27], and causal inference [28], in addition to the polynomial inference
problem already mentioned.
A strategy for the effect accounting problem maps finite input sequences in Kfin to potential answers or to ‘?’,
which indicates refusal to choose an answer. Strategy σ solves the effect accounting problem iff6 for each w ∈ K ,
lim
i→∞ σ(w|i) = T(w).
5 The idea is to approximate the usual situation in statistics: increasing the sample size tightens interval estimates of the values of the function at
each argument. Here, the shrinking intervals are guaranteed to catch the truth exactly, rather than just with high probability. The analogy is sketched
in greater detail in the conclusion.
6 That is, if and only if.
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One obvious solution to the effect accounting problem is the strategy σ0(e) = T(e), which guesses exactly the effects
it has seen so far. If the possibility of infinitely many effects were admitted, then the effect accounting problem would
not be solvable at all, due to a classic result by Gold [11].
Ockham’s razor is the principle that one should never output an informative answer unless that answer is among
the simplest answers compatible with experience. In the effect accounting problem, it seems that there is a uniquely
simplest answer compatible with experience e, namely, T(e), where (e) is the set of all effects presented along e.
Thus, strategy σ is Ockham at e iff for each e ∈ Kfin:
σ(e) = T(e) or σ(e) = ‘?’.
As stated, Ockham’s razor is compatible with suspension of judgment at any time. If the inputs currently received
are e = (e0, . . . , en+1), then let the previous evidential state be e− = (e0, . . . , en) (where e− is stipulated to denote
the empty sequence if e is empty). Say that solution σ is stalwart at e iff for each e ∈ Kfin:
σ(e) = T(e) if σ(e−) = T(e).
The intuition behind stalwartness is that there is no better explanation than the simplest one, so why drop it after
selecting it?7 One may speak of stalwartness and/or Ockham’s razor as being satisfied from e onward (i.e., at each
extension e′ of e compatible with K ) or always (i.e., at each e ∈ Kfin).
The obvious solution σ0(e) = T(e) is both stalwart and Ockham. A more plausible sort of stalwart, Ockham
solution suspends judgment for some time before plumping for the simplest answer, and then hangs onto it until it is
dethroned by experience. But as obvious as such strategies seem, neither Ockham’s razor nor stalwartness is necessary
for solving the effect accounting problem. For example, one could start with answer TA where A 6= ∅ and retract back
to ∅ if no effect appears by stage 1000. Or one could spontaneously retract T(e−) at e, even though no new effect has
been seen at e, and then return to set T(e) thereafter. In either case, one would still converge to the true answer in
the limit. The trouble is that there are infinitely many ways to solve the effect accounting problem, just as there are
infinitely many algorithmic solutions to a solvable computational problem. The nuances of programming practice –
the very stuff of textbook computer science – are derived not from solvability, but from efficiency or computational
complexity (e.g., the time or storage space required to find the right answer). The proposal, developed in detail below,
is that the nuances of scientific method are similarly grounded in the efficiency of empirical inquiry.
3. Costs of inquiry
Consider some plausible measures of the complexity or cost of converging to the true answer to the effect
accounting problem. An obvious cost is the number of times the strategy produces a false answer prior to convergence
to the true one, since error is obviously to be avoided if possible. Another is the number of times a conclusion is “taken
back” or retracted prior to convergence, which corresponds to the degree of “straightness” of the path followed to the
truth.8 The uninformative output ‘?’ is not, properly speaking, a conclusion, so dropping ‘?’ in favor of a conclusion
does not count as a retraction. One might also wish to minimize the respective times by which these retractions occur,
since there is no point “living a lie” longer than necessary, or allowing subsidiary conclusions to accumulate prior
to being “flushed” when the retraction occurs. Taken together, these statistics concern the accuracy, bumpiness, and
timeliness of one’s route to the truth, and provide a fair picture of the overall quality or efficiency of inquiry so far as
7 Stalwartness can be counter-intuitive if the problem under consideration is modeled too coarsely. Suppose that you are watching a cannon
factory that may produce a cannon that may produce a shot. After watching the factory fail to produce a cannon for a long time, you might
reasonably come to conclude that it will never succeed, so you will never see one of its cannons produce a shot. But then when the factory finally
rolls out its first cannon, you might very well retract your conclusion that you will never see one of their cannons shoot, since you have no prior
experience with cannon built by this factory. If the rolling out of the cannon and the shot of the cannon are both effects, then the loss of confidence
when the cannon appears satisfies stalwartness. If only the shot is an effect, however, then the loss of confidence violates stalwartness.
8 Putnam [25] proposed and analyzed the idea of bounding retractions in inference. Retractions are calledmind-changes in computational learning
theory (cf. Jain et al. [15]) and contractions in the literature on belief revision [9]. The former literature has focused on problem complexity rather
than upon justifying particular strategies like Ockham’s razor [6], and the latter on minimizing the amount of information retracted in one step in
the face of inconsistency. A general perspective on complexity measures for inductive inference which includes mind-changes as a special case is
developed in [4]. Earlier versions of the arguments presented below appear in [17] and [26].
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finding the truth is concerned. For a given strategy σ and infinite input stream w, let the loss or complexity of σ in w
be represented by the pair
λ(σ,w) = (q, (r1, . . . , rk)),
where q is the total number of errors or false answers output by σ in w, k is the total number of retractions performed
by σ in w, and ri is the stage of inquiry at which the i th retraction occurs.
Minimizing these costs jointly can occasion some hard choices (e.g., vacillating between answer A and ‘?’ for
two hundred times results in one hundred more retractions than sticking with A for two hundred times, but may also
commit one hundred more errors if A is false). Happily, it turns out that the hard choices are irrelevant to the argument
that follows: the only comparisons that matter are those in which one cost sequence is as good as or better than another
in every respect. Accordingly, let (q, (r1, . . . , rk)) ≤ (q ′, (r ′0, . . . , r ′k′)) iff
(1) q ≤ q ′ and
(2) there exists a sub-sequence (u0, . . . , uk) of (r ′0, . . . , r ′k′) such that for each i from 1 to k, ri ≤ ui .
Then for cost pairs v, v′, define v < v′ iff v ≤ v′ but v′ ≤ v. Relation ≤ may be referred to as Pareto comparison
and relation< is called weak Pareto dominance with respect to retractions, retraction times, and errors. So to rephrase
the point, the only comparisons that will be made about convergent performance of empirical strategies are the
uncontroversial, Pareto comparisons among cost pairs.
The next step is to define and to compare worst-case bounds on sets of cost vectors. Let ω denote the first infinite
ordinal number. A potential cost bound is a pair (q, γ ) where q ≤ ω and γ is a finite or infinite, non-descending
sequence of entries ≤ ω in which no finite entry occurs more than once. Then if v is a cost vector and b is a cost
bound, v ≤ b can be defined just as for cost vectors, themselves. Cost bounds b, c may now be compared as follows:
b ≤ c iff for each cost pair v, if v ≤ b then v ≤ c;
b ≡ c iff b ≤ c and c ≤ b;
b < c iff b ≤ c and c 6≤ b.
It follows, for example, that (4, (2)) < (ω, (2, ω)) < (ω, (0, 1, 2, . . .)) ≡ (ω, (ω, ω, ω, . . .)).
Now each set C of cost vectors has a unique (up to equivalence) least upper bound sup(C) among the potential
upper bounds, computed as follows. Define:
ErrC = {c : there exists τ such that (c, τ ) ∈ C};
RetC = {τ : there exists c such that (c, τ ) ∈ C}.
Then
sup(C) = (sup(ErrC ), sup(RetC )),
where sup(RetC ) is defined as follows. Let R be an arbitrary set of ascending, finite sequences of natural numbers. If
there is no finite bound on the lengths of the sequences in R, then, evidently, there is no finite γ such that for each
τ ∈ R, τ ≤ γ . Hence, sup(R) must have infinite length. But for each pair (q, γ ), (q, γ ′) of potential bounds such that
γ, γ ′ are both infinite, (q, γ ) ≡ (q, γ ′), so one may represent all such bounds by (q,∞). If, on the other hand, there
is a maximum length m on the length of the sequences in R, then sup(R) can be constructed in the following way: list
the (countably many) elements of R in a right-justified column and then take the supremum ≤ ω in each column to
arrive at sequence sup(R) whose length is m.
Suppose that finite input sequence e has already been seen. Then one knows that possibilities incompatible with 
cannot happen, so define the worst-case cost of σ given e as:
λe(σ ) = sup
w∈Ke
λ(σ,w).
4. Empirical complexity and efficiency
As in typical, computational problems, no solution to the effect accounting problem achieves a non-trivial cost
bound over the whole problem, since each theory can be overturned by future effects in the arbitrarily remote future.
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Computational complexity theory has long since sidestepped that difficulty by partitioning problem instances (inputs)
into respective sizes and then then examining worst-case resource consumption as instance size increases. Since there
are only finitely many inputs of each size, worst case bounds exist necessarily for each size and these can be compared
across algorithms. In the case of empirical problems, the input from the environment is potentially infinite, so input
length no longer distinguishes among problem instances, but in this case there is another plausible measure of instance
complexity, namely, the total number of effects presented. If s ∈ K ∪ Kfin, then let the empirical complexity of s be
given by
c(s) = |(s)|.
If w ∈ K and e ∈ Kfin, let the conditional empirical complexity of w at e be given by:
c(w, e) = c(w)− c(e).
Then the nth empirical complexity class at e is defined by:
Ce(n) = {w ∈ Ke : c(w, e) = n}.
Let σ be an arbitrary solution to the effect accounting problem. Define the worst-case loss of solution σ over
complexity class Ce(n) as:
λe(σ, n) = sup
w∈Ce(n)
λ(σ,w),
where the supremum is understood in the sense of the preceding section.
Suppose that you have been following strategy σ and that the input sequence you have received so far is e,
and that you have not yet produced an output in response to e. Then since the past cannot be altered, there is no
point considering problem instances incompatible with e or alternative strategies that do not agree with σ along e−.
Accordingly, say that σ ′ agrees with σ along e− (abbreviated σ e− σ ′) iff for each e′ < e, σ(e′) = σ ′(e′).
Given solutions σ, σ ′, the following, natural, worst-case performance comparisons can be defined at e:
σ ≤e σ ′ iff (∀n) λe(σ, n) ≤ λe(σ ′, n);
σ ≺e σ ′ iff (∀n) Ce(n) 6= ∅ ⇒ λe(σ, n) < λe(σ ′, n);
σ <e σ
′ iff σ ≤e σ ′ and σ ′ 6≤e σ ;
σ ≡e σ ′ iff σ ≤e σ ′ and σ ′ ≤e σ ;
σ qe σ ′ iff σ 6≤e σ ′ and σ ′ 6≤e σ.
These comparisons give rise to some natural, worst-case concepts of efficiency and inefficiency:
σ is strongly beaten at e iff (∃ solution σ ′ e− σ) σ ′ ≺e σ ;
σ is weakly beaten at e iff (∃ solution σ ′ e− σ) σ ′ <e σ ;
σ is unbeaten at e iff (∀ solution σ ′ e− σ) σ ′ 6<e σ ;
σ is efficient at e iff (∀ solution σ ′ e− σ) σ ′ ≥e σ.
The preceding properties are ordered from the least desirable to the most desirable. A solution that is strongly beaten
does worse than some solution over each problem instance size. A solution that is weakly beaten does as poorly as
some solution over each problem instance size and worse over some problem instance size. A solution is unbeaten
if it is as good as or merely incomparable with an arbitrary solution. Efficiency, on the other hand, is a rather strong
recommendation, so far as worst-case recommendations go, for an efficient solution is as good as an arbitrary solution
in each problem instance size. Since efficiency can be reassessed at each time, one may speak of being efficient from
e onward or always.
5. Efficiency implies Ockham’s razor
Now it is easy to argue for the efficiency of stalwart, Ockham solutions to the effect accounting problem. In spite of
all the hard choices between errors and retractions that particular pairs of solutions might occasion, each stalwart,
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Ockham solution is as good as an arbitrary solution in the worst case over each problem instance size. Indeed,
something stronger is true: it is never too late for prodigal methods to repent and return to the Ockham fold, for
born-again Ockham solutions are efficient from their moment of rebirth onward. One may say, therefore, that stalwart,
Ockham solutions are not merely efficient, but stably efficient, in the sense that past deviations from efficiency (for
whatever reason) do not undermine the efficiency argument.
Proposition 1 (Efficiency of Stalwart, Ockham Solutions). Let the cost be Pareto-comparison of error, retractions,
and retraction times, and let σ be a solution to the effect accounting problem that is stalwart and Ockham from finite
input sequence e onward. Then σ is an efficient solution to the effect accounting problem from e onward.
Proof. Let σ be a solution that is stalwart and Ockham from e′ onward. Let e ≥ e′ have length j . Let σ ′ be an
arbitrary solution such that σ ′ e− σ . Let r1, . . . , rk be the retraction times for both σ and σ ′ along e−. Let q denote
the number of times σ produces an answer other than T(e) along e−. Let w ∈ Ce(0).
Consider the hard case in which σ retracts at e. In w, σ never retracts after e (but may do so at e), and σ produces
only the true answer (e) after e. Hence:
λe(σ, 0) ≤ (q, (r1, . . . , rk, j)).
There exists w0 ∈ Ce(0) (just extend e by repeating (e) forever). Then σ(e−) = σ ′(e−) is false in w0. So since σ ′ is
a solution, σ ′ converges to the true answer (e) in w0 at some point after e−, which implies a retraction at some point
no sooner than e. Hence:
λe(σ
′, 0) ≥ (q, (r1, . . . , rk, j)) ≥ λe(σ, 0).
Suppose that Ce(n + 1) 6= ∅. Since σ is a stalwart, Ockham solution, σ retracts at most once at each new effect,
so:
λe(σ, n + 1) ≤ (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, j, ω, . . . , ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1 times
)).
Let arbitrarily large natural number i be given and let A0 = (e). Since σ ′ is a solution, σ ′ eventually converges
to TA0 in w0, so there exists e0 such that e ≤ e0 < w0 by which σ ′ has retracted the false answer σ ′(e−), and has
produced the true answer TA0 successively at least i times after the end of e. So σ
′ retracts at least as late as e in e0.
Then there exists w1 ∈ Ce(1) such that e0 < w1 (since Ce(n + 1) 6= ∅, nature can choose some x0 ∈ E − A0 and
extend e0 forever with the set of effects A1 = A0∪{x0}). Then σ ′ must converge to TA1 inw1 and, therefore, produces
TA1 successively at least i times after the end of e0 along some initial segment e1 of w. Continuing in this manner,
construct wn+1 ∈ Ce(n + 1). Then
λe(σ
′, wn+1) ≥ (i, (r1, . . . , rk, j, j + 1i, j + 2i, . . . , j + (n + 1)i)).
Since i is arbitrary,
λe(σ
′, n + 1) ≥ (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, j, ω, . . . , ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1 times
)) ≥ λe(σ, n + 1).
In the easy case in which σ does not retract at e, the argument is similar to that in the preceding case except that
the retraction at j is deleted from all the bounds. a
Efficiency is only half of the argument for Ockham’s razor. The other half is that non-Ockham solutions and
non-stalwart solutions are not merely inefficient, but are strongly beaten at each violation of either principle. So not
only do you become efficient as soon as you return, permanently, to the stalwart, Ockham fold—you are strongly
beaten each time you stray, no matter what you have done in the past: so the entire argument is stable in spite of
past deviations. That is important, for Ockham violations are practically unavoidable in real science because the
simplest theory cannot always be formulated in time to forestall the acceptance of a more easily conceived but
more complex alternative (e.g., Ptolemaic astronomy vs. Copernican astronomy, Newtonian optics vs. wave optics,
Newtonian kinematics vs. relativistic kinematics, and special creation vs. natural selection). So although it has been
urged that scientific revolutions are extra-rational events governed only by the vagaries of scientific politics [22],
revision to the simpler theory when it is discovered has a clean explanation in terms of truth-finding efficiency.
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Proposition 2 (Efficiency Implies the Stalwart, Ockham Property). Let the costs be as in Proposition 1 and let σ
solve the effect accounting problem. If σ is not Ockham or is not stalwart at e, then σ is strongly beaten at e.9
Proof. Let σ be a solution that violates either Ockham’s razor or stalwartness at e of length j . Let σ ′ return (e′) at
each e′ ∈ Kfin such that e′ ≥ e and let σ ′ agree with σ otherwise. Then σ ′ e− σ by construction, and σ ′ is evidently
a solution. Let r1, . . . , rk be the retraction times for both σ and σ ′ along e up to but not including the last entry in e.
Consider the case in which σ violates Ockham’s razor at e. So for some A ⊆ E such that A 6= (e), σ(e) = TA.
Let w ∈ Ce(0). Then TA is false in w and T(e) is true in w. Let q denote the number of times both σ and σ ′ produce
an answer other than T(e) along e−. Since σ ′ produces the true answer T(e) at e in w and continues to produce T(e)
thereafter:
λe(σ
′, 0) ≤ (q, (r1, . . . , rk, j)).
There exists w0 in Ce(0) (just extend e forever with (e)). Since TA is false in w0 and σ is a solution, σ retracts TA in
w0 at some stage greater than j , so
λe(σ, 0) ≥ λ(σ,w0) ≥ (q + 1, (r1, . . . , rk, j + 1)) > λe(σ ′, 0).
Suppose that Ce(n + 1) 6= ∅. Since σ ′ produces T(e′) at each e′ ≥ e,
λe(σ
′, n + 1) ≤ (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, j, ω, . . . , ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1 times
)).
Let i ∈ ω. Answer TA is false in w0, so since σ is a solution, σ eventually converges to TA0 such that A0 = (e) in
w0, so there exists e0 properly extending e by which σ has produced TA0 successively at least i times after the end of
e and σ revises TA to TA0 no sooner than stage j + 1. Now continue according to the recipe described in the proof of
Proposition 1 to construct wn+1 ∈ Ce(n + 1) such that:
λ(σ,wn+1) ≥ (i, (r1, . . . , rk, j + 1, j + 1i, j + 2i, . . . , j + (n + 1)i)).
Since i is arbitrary,
λe(σ, n + 1) ≥ (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, j + 1, ω, . . . , ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1 times
)) > λe(σ
′, n + 1).
Next, consider the case in which σ violates stalwartness at e. So σ(e−) = T(e) but σ(e) 6= T(e). Let w ∈ Ce(0).
Let q denote the number of errors committed in w by both σ and σ ′ along e−. Since σ ′(e−) = T(e), it follows that σ ′
does not retract in w from j onward, so:
λe(σ
′, 0) ≤ (q, (r1, . . . , rk)).
Again, there exists w0 in Ce(0). Since σ retracts at j ,
λe(σ, 0) ≥ (q, (r1, . . . , rk, j)) > λe(σ ′, 0).
Let Ce(n + 1) 6= ∅. Since for each e′ ≥ e, σ ′ produces T(e′) at e′,
λe(σ
′, n + 1) ≤ (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, ω, . . . , ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1 times
)).
Let an arbitrary natural number i be given. Since σ retracts at j , one may continue according to the recipe described
in the proof of Proposition 1 to construct wn+1, extending e in Ce(n + 1) such that:
λ(σ,wn+1) ≥ (i, (r1, . . . , rk, j, j + 1i, j + 2i, . . . , j + (n + 1)i)).
9 Proposition 2 remains true if total elapsed time to convergence to the truth (i.e., modulus of convergence) is included among the other costs.
Proposition 1 does not, since convergence time efficiency demands, rather counter-intuitively, that one leap for the uniquely simplest answer as
soon as it exists. Therefore, a more intuitive theory results if convergence time is eliminated from the list of costs.
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Since i is arbitrary,
λe(σ, n + 1) ≥ (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, j, ω, . . . , ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1 times
)) > λe(σ
′, n + 1). a
The proof of Proposition 2 entails some extra information. Ockham violators are strongly beaten with respect to
timed retractions alone and are weakly beaten in terms of errors alone. Solutions that violate stalwartness are strongly
beaten in terms of retractions but are not even weakly beaten in terms of errors. It is also worth mentioning that
solutions that over-count are strongly beaten in terms of retractions alone at the first violation of Ockham’s razor.
Solutions that cling to a refuted answer “save” one retraction, and hence are strongly beaten only in the sense that
they can be forced to skip the missed retraction later than an “honest” solution would have performed. So the beating
argument is not stable with respect to retractions alone.
Together, Propositions 1 and 2 yield the following, crisp characterization of efficiency.
Corollary 1 (Efficiency Characterization). Let the costs be as in Proposition 1, and let σ solve the effect accounting
problem. Let e be a finite input sequence. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(1) σ is stalwart and Ockham from e onward;
(2) σ is efficient from e onward;
(3) σ is never weakly beaten from e onward;
(4) σ is never strongly beaten from e onward.
Proof. Implications (2)⇒ (3)⇒ (4) are immediate from the definitions. Implication (4)⇒ (1) is by Proposition 2.
Implication (1)⇒ (2) is from Proposition 1. a
So the set of all solutions to the effect accounting problem is cleanly partitioned at e into two groups: the solutions
that are stalwart, Ockham, and efficient from e onward, and the solutions that are strongly beaten at some stage e′ ≥ e
due to future violations of the stalwart, Ockham property. Furthermore, it follows immediately that if σ , σ ′ are both
efficient at e, then σ ≡e σ ′—and that if σ is efficient and σ ′ is not, then σ e σ ′. Hence, the awkward situation in
which σ qe σ ′ arises only if both σ and σ ′ are both strongly beaten at e.
The idea that one should select answer T(e) in light of e is so natural that one feels there must be some simpler
explanation than the one just given; but the obvious candidates fail, which helps to explain the usual recourse to circles
or Providence in standard explanations of Ockham’s razor: (1) One cannot establish weak dominance for Ockham
methods with respect to all problem instances jointly, because anticipation of unseen effects might be vindicated
immediately, saving retractions that the Ockham method would have to perform when the effects appear; (2) Nor can
one show that Ockham’s razor does best in terms of a global worst-case bound over all problem instances (minimax
theory), for such worst-case bounds on errors and retractions are trivially infinite for all methods at every stage; and
(3) Nor can one show a decisive advantage for Ockham’s razor in terms of expected retractions. For example, if the
question is whether one will see at least one effect, then the expected retractions of the obvious strategy σ(e) = (e)
are less than those of an arbitrary Ockham violator only if the prior probability of the simpler answer is at least one
half, so that if more than one complex world carries nonzero probability, no complex world is as probable as the
simplest world, which begs the question in favor of simplicity.10 If the prior probability of the simple hypothesis
drops below 0.5, the advantage lies not only with violating Ockham’s razor, but with violating it more rather than less.
10 Let σi be a non-Ockham strategy that starts by guessing answer ≥ 1 until no effect is seen by stage i , at which point σi returns 0. If the effect is
ever seen, σ returns answer ≥ 1. Consider the competing, Ockham method σ that always guesses 0 until the effect is seen, at which time σ returns
answer ≥ 1. Consider probabilities at stage zero. Let a denote the probability that no effect occurs, let b denote the probability that an effect occurs
no later than stage i and let c denote the probability that an the first effect occurs after stage i . Then, a priori, the expected retractions of σi are
given by a + 2c, whereas the expected retractions of σ are b+ c. So the Ockham strategy σ does better when a + c > b. Since a + c+ b = 1, this
is true iff b < .5. One can make c arbitrarily small by increasing i , so if the Ockham strategy is to beat the expected retractions of an arbitrary σi ,
then a ≥ b. That implies that each of the several (complex) possibilities over which mass b is distributed receives less probability than the simple
world carrying probability b. This bias increases with i .
K.T. Kelly / Theoretical Computer Science 383 (2007) 270–289 279
6. Stochastic methods
The preceding arguments still work when empirical strategies are stochastic. In that case, convergence is replaced
with convergence in chance, and retractions are replaced with retractions in chance, where a retraction in chance is
any drop in the chance of producing an answer from stage e− to stage e. Then, the best worst-case upper bounds
on retractions in chance in each empirical complexity class are no better than those for deterministic methods. Let
r denote an arbitrarily small but non-zero real number, and let k be an arbitrary, empirical complexity. Nature can
present no effects until the stochastic solution σ achieves chance> 1−r/2k of producing answer T{}. Now nature can
present only effect x0 until stochastic solution σ achieves chance > 1− r/2k of producing T{x0}. Nature can continue
this way until k distinct effects have been presented. The total retractions in probability incurred by σ in complexity
class Ce(k) are, therefore,> k(1−r). Since r is arbitrarily low, the best worst-case bound on retractions in probability
over Ce(k) is k, as in the deterministic case. Also, any nonzero chance of violating Ockham’s razor or stalwartness
at e gets added to the subsequent retractions nature can force from e onward, as in the deterministic argument, so
efficiency precludes any non-zero chance of such violations.
7. A more general setting for the argument
The preceding argument for Ockham’s razor merely stipulates what counts as an empirical effect and complexity
is defined in terms of such effects. The argument would be strengthened by a general definition of empirical effects
that applies to a broad range of problems and that still supports the preceding argument over that range of problems.
The balance of the paper presents just such a generalization.
An empirical inference problem is a pair (K ,Π ), where presupposition K is a set of infinite sequences of inputs
called worlds and question Π partitions K into potential answers. Define Kfin and Ke as before. There is no longer
any stipulation about what an effect is or when it is presented. If w ∈ K , then let Tw ∈ Π denote the unique answer
true in w. A strategy is a mapping from finite sequences of inputs to answers in Π ∪ {‘?’}. A solution is a strategy
such that for each w ∈ K , limi→∞ σ(w|i) = Tw. To keep the text readable, references to (K ,Π ) are suppressed as
far as possible.
8. Empirical effects and world complexity
There have been various attempts to define empirical complexity in terms of descriptive or computational syntax
(e.g. Vitanyi and Li [31]), but these proposals are implausible as efficient guides to the truth, because such notions are
not invariant under recoding of the data, making Ockham’s razor a mere matter of evidential description [12]. Here
is a plausible proposal that is invariant under recoding of inputs and that has the further advantage of preserving the
efficiency argument for Ockham’s razor.
In the effect accounting problem, nature can force an arbitrary solution through arbitrary, finite, sub-sequences of
answer sequence:
b = (T{}, T{x0}, T{x0,x1}, . . .)
according to the argument for Proposition 1: after presenting effect x0, nature can force only finite sub-sequences of
the truncated sequence b′ = (T{x0}, T{x0,x1}, . . .), and so forth. Hence, the presentation of effect x0 leaves an indelible,
structural “footprint” among the sequences of answers forcible by nature from that point onward, in the sense that
there is a non-empty, finite, forcible sequence u of answers such that for each sequence of answers b′ forcible after
effect x0 is presented, the sequence b = u ∗ b′ is forcible before x0 is presented:
b = ( T{}︸︷︷︸
u
, T{x0}, T{x0,x1}, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
b′
).
It remains to express the preceding idea with mathematical precision. The following definitions are all relative to
a fixed problem (K ,Π ). An answer pattern is a finite sequence of answers in which no answer occurs immediately
after itself. Let g be an answer pattern. Say that g is forcible given e of length n just in case for each solution σ there
exist k and e′ > e of length n + k such that g is a sub-sequence of (σ (e′|n), . . . , σ (e′|(n + k))). Say that answer
pattern g is backwards-maximally forcible at e iff g is forcible given e, and for each forcible answer pattern g′ given
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e, if g ⊆ g′ then g ≤ g′ (i.e., it is impossible to extend g to a forcible sequence at e other than by adding further
answers to the end of g, so g is extendable but has no “gaps”). Let ∆e denote the set of all answer patterns that are
backwards-maximally forcible at e. Several regularity assumptions govern the results that follow.
Effects are now definable in terms of ∆e along the lines discussed informally above. Let e be a non-empty input
sequence in Ke and let u be a non-empty answer pattern. Then effect u is presented at the end of e iff:
(∀b ∈ ∆e) u ∗ b ∈ ∆e− .
In the effect accounting problem, the number of effects presented at the end of e corresponds to the length of u in
the preceding definition, so one might define the complexity of world w as the total length of the effect sequences
encountered along w. Alternatively, one might simply count the number of times that at least one effect is presented.
It turns out not to matter for the following efficiency theorems which course is adopted, so the latter, simpler path is
adopted. If s is a sequence in K ∪ Kfin, w ∈ K , e ∈ Kfin, and A ∈ Π , define empirical complexity of worlds and
answers as follows:
c(s) = |{e′ ≤ s : e′ is an effect}|;
c(w, e) = c(w)− c(e);
c(A) = min
w∈A c(w);
c(A, e) = c(A)− c(e);
Ce(n) = {w ∈ Ke : c(w, e) = n}.
Empirical complexity, so defined, is invariant under a 1-1 recoding of the inputs, but is highly dependent upon
the structure of the problem (K ,Π ), in the sense that the same world w could be arbitrarily simple or arbitrarily
complex depending upon the problem under consideration. Indeed, if Ockham’s razor is to have anything to do with
the objective efficiency in the problem of finding the true answer, the simplicity of answers must depend upon the
structure of the problem, because efficiency itself does. For example, if Π = ({w}, K − {w}), then c({w}, e) = 0,
whichever worldw is singled out as the “point null hypothesis” {w} ∈ Π . That is intuitive, since it is common practice
to favor the simple point hypothesis as the “null” hypothesis in pair-wise decisions. In the present setup, that practice
is another instance of Ockham’s razor, a striking connection that is impossible to see if empirical complexity is viewed
as a problem-independent property of worlds.
9. Ockham’s razor and stalwartness
Answer T is a simplest answer at e iff
c(T, e) = min
T ′∈Π
c(T ′, e).
Equivalently, answer T is simplest at e iff c(T, e) = 0 (cf. Lemma 5 in Appendix B). Since there may be several
simplest answers at e, Ockham’s razor has two versions, strong and weak. Solution σ satisfies the the weak version of
Ockham’s razor at e iff σ(e) is a simplest answer at e if σ(e) 6=‘?’. Solution σ satisfies the strong version of Ockham’s
razor at e iff σ(e) is the uniquely simplest answer at e if σ(e) 6= ‘?’. Stalwartness at e requires that if the scientist’s
output T at e− is uniquely the simplest at e, then the scientist continues to select T at e.
Ockham’s razor may be expressed in terms of simplicity rather than complexity, using a standard rescaling trick
familiar from information theory. Define conditional simplicity as:
s(T, e) = exp(−c(T, e)).
The preceding definition reveals an interesting connection between Ockham’s razor and Bayesian updating, for it
follows immediately from the definition of c(T, e) that:
c(T, e) = c(T ∩ Ke)− c(Ke).
Applying the definition of s(T, e) to both sides of the preceding equation yields:
s(T, e) = s(T ∩ Ke)
s(Ke)
,
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which is the usual definition of Bayesian updating.11 Thus, updating a prior bias toward simplicity follows from
Ockham’s razor and, ultimately, from efficiency. The standard, Bayesian story simply assumes that one updates from
a prior simplicity bias, without deriving either the updating rule or the bias from truth-finding performance.
10. Some regularity assumptions
In some pathological problems, no answer is forcible “first”, so∆e is empty even though arbitrarily long sequences
of answers are forcible.12 Such problems are excluded from consideration.
Axiom 1 (Forcibility is Well-Founded). If pattern b is forcible at e, then there exists b′ ∈ ∆e such that b ⊆ b′.
As a simplifying assumption, problems in which the same answer occurs more than once in a forcible pattern are also
excluded from consideration. When this assumption is violated, one can typically choose a natural way to refine the
problem so as to satisfy it. For example, if the question is whether the total number of effects is even or odd, one can
refine the question to ask for the total number of effects.13
Axiom 2 (Forcibility is Acyclic). If pattern b is forcible at e, then no answer occurs more than once in b.
A further simplifying assumption is that each answer in a backwards-maximally forcible sequence can be decremented
individually, without the intrusion of new, intermediate answers that weren’t already in the sequence.14
Axiom 3 (Monotonicity). Let T ∗ T ′ ∗ b ∈ ∆e. Then there exists a finite e′ > e such that exactly one effect occurs
along e′ after e and T ′ ∗ b ∈ ∆e′ .
There exist problems that have no strongly Ockham solution. In such problems, waiting for simplicity to determine
uniquely what one should say does not suffice to solve the problem—extra choices that break the symmetry among
simplest answers must be made. For example, suppose that the problem is to say when each effect occurs, in addition
to just listing them. In that problem, only answer patterns of unit length are forcible and there are always forcible
unit-length patterns, so there are no effects and every answer compatible with experience is simplest at each stage,
so the strong version of Ockham’s razor precludes all answers except for ‘?’. Such problems are excluded from
consideration.
Axiom 4 (Strong Ockham Solvability). The problem under consideration is strongly Ockham solvable.
Say that a problem is nested if there exists a uniquely simplest answer at each e compatible with K . For example,
the problem of accounting for effects is nested, but that is no longer the case if new effects are announced by a horn
prior to their appearance. The nesting property is not assumed as an axiom, but it does yield stronger results, so the
case of nested problems is considered separately.
11. General argument for Ockham’s razor
The following assumptions govern all of the results that follow (including those presented in Appendices A and
B). Proofs are presented in Appendix A.
11 However, s(T, e) is not a probability measure, since several, mutually incompatible propositions can carry unit simplicity.
12 E.g., suppose that tomorrow you may see any number of effects and that any of the effects may disappear at any time thereafter. The problem
is to count the total number of effects. At the outset, each finite, descending sequence of effect counts is forcible, so each forcible pattern can be
extended at the beginning to a forcible pattern.
13 There may be many, materially inequivalent such refinements. The even/odd problem just described is, indeed, a coarsening of the problem of
counting effects. But, following the strategy of [12], say that a neffect is an effect at any stage but stage 1, at which time it is a non-effect. Then
finitely many effects are the same as finitely many neffects, so K is preserved, and evenly many effects are the same as oddly many neffects, so the
answers “even” and “odd” are preserved. Hence, neffect counting is also a refinement of the even/odd problem, but neffect counting is a materially
distinct problem from effect counting.
14 Suppose that the task is to report the total number of effects n you will see if n 6= 2 and to report (n, k), where k is the time of appearance of
the second effect otherwise. Then ∆() = {(0, 1, 3, 4, . . .)}. But upon receipt of input sequence ({x1, x2}), ∆e = {(2, 1), 3, 4, . . .)}, so there is no
finite pattern b such that b ∗ (0, 1, 2, . . . , n) ∈ ∆(). This example violates even the weaker requirement that b ∈ ∆({x1,x2}) is a sub-pattern of some
pattern in∆().
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(1) (K ,Π ) is an empirical problem satisfying Axioms 1–4;
(2) Empirical complexity is defined in terms of forcibility, in the structural manner just discussed;
(3) Efficiency and strong and weak beating are defined in terms of empirical complexity as in the discussion of the
effect accounting problem;
(4) σ is a solution;
(5) e ∈ Kfin.
To begin with, stalwart, Ockham solutions to nested problems are stably efficient and stalwart, strongly Ockham
solutions are efficient in general, albeit not necessarily stably so.
Proposition 3 (Strong Ockham and Stalwartness Imply Efficiency).
(1) If the problem is nested and σ is stalwart and Ockham from e onward, then σ is efficient from e onward.
(2) If σ is always stalwart and Ockham, then σ is always efficient.
Furthermore, violators of Ockham’s razor or stalwartness are not merely inefficient, but strongly beaten at each
violation, so Ockham’s razor has a stable sanction.
Proposition 4 (Efficiency Stably Implies Ockham’s Razor and Stalwartness). If σ violates Ockham’s razor or
stalwartness at e, then σ is strongly beaten at e.
In general, violations of the strong version of Ockham’s razor incur only a weak beating at the first violation, so
the strong version of Ockham’s razor has a weaker motivation than does the weak one.15 The beating occasioned
by a violation of the strong Ockham principle may be strong, however, even when several answers are simplest: for
example when effects are announced by a horn.
Proposition 5 (Efficiency Implies Strong Ockham). If σ violates the strong Ockham principle or stalwartness at e,
then σ is weakly beaten at the first moment e′ along e at which the strong Ockham principle is violated.
The following corollary extends Corollary 1 to all nested problems satisfying Axioms 1–4.
Corollary 2 (Efficiency Characterization, Nested Case). If the problem is nested, then the following statements are
equivalent.
(1) σ is efficient from e onward;
(2) σ is never weakly beaten from e onward;
(3) σ is never strongly beaten from e onward;
(4) σ is stalwart and Ockham from e onward.
In general, stalwart, strongly Ockham solutions are still uniquely best, but the argument is weaker: the beating
incurred by violators may be weak or unstable.
Corollary 3 (Efficiency Characterization, General Case). The following statements are equivalent.
(1) σ is always efficient.
(2) σ is never weakly beaten.
(3) σ is always stalwart and strongly Ockham.
Since the problem is assumed to be strongly Ockham solvable (Axiom 4), there exists a strongly Ockham solution
and, hence16:
Corollary 4. There exists a stalwart, strongly Ockham solution.
Hence, given Axioms 1–4, one ought to use a stalwart, Ockham solution and one should not use any other sort of
solution, which resolves the simplicity puzzle with which the paper began.
15 For example, suppose at e that a curtain will be opened tomorrow that reveals either a marble emitter or nothing at all. The question is whether
there is an emitter behind the curtain and, if so, how many marbles it will emit. The no-emitter world and the marble-free emitter world are both
simplest in this example, so the strong Ockham principle requires that one suspend judgment between the corresponding answers until the curtain is
opened. Suppose that you guess that you are in the marble-free emitter world, in spite of the strong Ockham principle. You are not strongly beaten,
because you do as well as possible in each class Ce(k) such that k exceeds zero.
16 For a strongly Ockham solution converges to the uniquely simplest answer in each world and is not prevented from doing so by hanging onto
a uniquely simplest answer until it is no longer uniquely simplest.
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12. Conclusion
A fairly general explanation of Ockham’s razor and related methodological principles has been given in terms of
truth-finding efficiency. In nested problems, in which a uniquely simplest answer always exists, the result is that:
stable efficiency = Ockham’s razor+ stalwartness.
In general:
efficiency = strong Ockham’s razor+ stalwartness.
The underlying notion of efficiency is similar in spirit to that employed in standard, worst-case complexity analyses
of algorithm performance, with a few alterations suited to the unending character of empirical inquiry. The costs
considered are the number of errors and retractions prior to convergence, together with the elapsed time to each
retraction. The argument works without the need to broach the awkward question of trading errors against retractions
or retraction times. The standard, computer science concept of “problem instance size” is replaced with a mathematical
explication of the intuitive notion of the empirical complexity of a possible world relative to the inference problem at
hand. Efficiency means doing as well as an arbitrary solution in the worst case over each problem instance size. Not
only are violators of Ockham’s razor inefficient in this sense, they are strongly dominated with respect to worst-case
bounds over instance sizes. Thus, Ockham’s razor does have an objective, complexity-theoretic, connection to truth-
finding that works without either changing the question or begging it with prior probabilistic biases toward simple
worlds or simple theories.
The price of this objective non-circularity is that the explanation does not imply that the simpler answer is true or
has a high chance of being true. Ockham’s razor keeps you on the straightest possible path to the truth, but the path
may still have arbitrarily many twists and bends that steer you away from your goal from time to time – or even for
most of the time – prior to convergence. To demand more is to demand the impossible.
Many projects and questions remain. (1) Axioms 1–4 are neither principles of rationality nor universal features of
empirical problems; they are nothing but restrictions on the scope of the efficiency theorems and should, therefore, be
weakened as far as possible.
(2) It has not been shown that the proposed definition c(w, e) of empirical complexity is the only definition for
which the preceding propositions can be established. Indeed, the following, more sophisticated definition of empirical
complexity looks promising. Assume that for each world w ∈ K , the limit
∆w = lim
i→∞∆w|i
exists, in the sense that there exists n such that for each i ≥ n, ∆w|i = ∆w|n . Now, think of Γe = {∆w : w ∈ Ke}
as a set of states and let Γ = Γ(). Define accessibility between states in Γ as follows: D ≤ D′ iff for each e′ such
that D = ∆e there exists e′ ≥ e such that D′ = ∆e′ . The result of the construction, in many natural problems, is a
partial order (Γ ,≤), whose ascending paths are all of order type ≤ ω. Let Γmine denote the set of all states in Γe that
are minimal in the ≤ order. Let pi(∆) denote the set of all ≤-paths in Γ |e that originate in Γmine and terminate with∆.
Define c′(w, e) = sup{length(p) : p ∈ pi(∆w)}. The definition of c′(w, e) yields intuitive judgments about simplicity
over a broader range of problems than does the concept c(w, e) involved in the preceding proofs. Also, c′(w, e) allows
for a broader range of strongly-Ockham-solvable problems than does c(w, e).17
(3) Worlds are modeled as concrete input streams in the preceding development. Real scientific questions, insofar
as they are formalized at all, are usually formulated in terms of real-valued parameter spaces. Since the forcing and
convergence concepts employed in the theory all make sense in metrizable, separable topological spaces, it is both
promising and desirable to lift the preceding results to problems (K ,Π ) in which K is such a space. In this more
17 For example, suppose, in the effect accounting problem, that world w presents first the disjunctive information {x}∨{y, z}, which is interpreted
as saying that either x or both y, z will be seen, and that presents disjunct {x} followed by ∅ thereafter. Then for each e presenting no effects,
c(w, e) = 0. Hence, a strongly Ockham method must withhold judgment forever if the truth is T{x} and, therefore, never converges to the truth,
so the problem is not strongly Ockham-solvable, violating Axiom 4. On the other hand, c′(w, e) = 1 so, assuming that all disjunctive reports are
resolved, eventually, in favor of some disjunct (or, possibly, for both), the problem is strongly Ockham solvable according to the new definition and
the strong version of Ockham’s razor plausibly demands that one suspend judgment between disjuncts until the disjunction is resolved.
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general topological setting, an input stream can be modeled as an infinite, descending sequence of open neighborhoods
whose intersection is a subset of some answer to the problem. Efficiency and empirical complexity can then be defined
much as in the preceding development.
(4) The theory does not yet apply literally to statistical problems, but that is the ultimate aim. Here is a tentative
sketch of how it might go (cf. also Kelly [18], Kelly and Glymour [20]). In statistical problems, as in the case of
stochastic methods discussed above, the aim is to converge in probability to the true theory in a way that minimizes
retractions in probability and the times at which they occur. Retractions in chance are ubiquitous in statistics. For
example, consider a standard statistical test of the null hypothesis that the mean of a normal distribution is identically
zero. If the true value of the mean is non-zero but very small, then in small samples the test will very probably accept
the null hypothesis and in large samples it will very probably reject. No possible method that converges in chance
to the true answer to the binary question as sample size increases can avoid the retraction in chance (accept, reject).
Furthermore, favoring the rejection of the point hypothesis rather than its acceptance at small sample sizes risks, in
the worst case, an extra retraction in chance (reject, accept, reject). So favoring the null hypothesis in the usual way
by setting a “significance” level minimizes statistical retractions en route to the truth. Optimization of a statistical
procedure’s “power” can then be explained in terms of minimizing the time (i.e. sample size) to each retraction in
chance, since a sloppy statistical test will require a larger sample to reject the null hypothesis. But whereas the logic
of statistical testing is applied only to binary questions, the idea of minimizing retractions in chance applies more
broadly to model selection problems like statistical curve fitting that require arbitrarily many retractions. The hope is
that such an analysis will explain the intuitive bias toward simple laws in statistical curve fitting in terms of finding
the true model.
(5) Finally, the preceding results do not begin to address the crucial question of the trade-offs between ideal and
computational efficiency when it is intractable, or even impossible, to compute the set of simplest answers at e. At
least it provides an ideal framework that may serve as a guide toward the development of a more computationally
realistic analysis (cf. Kelly [19] for a discussion of Ockham’s razor in the purely computational realm).
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Appendix A. Proofs of propositions
In the following results, (K ,Π ) is assumed to be an empirical problem satisfying 1 and 4. Adopt the abbreviation:
ω(n) = ω, . . . , ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
n repetitions
.
Let δe(σ,w) denote the number of errors committed by σ in w along e < w. Let
δe(σ, 0) = max
w∈Ce(0)
δe−(σ,w).
Proof of Proposition 3(1). Let the problem be nested and let σ ′ be a solution that is Ockham and stalwart from
e onward. Since the problem is nested, σ ′ is also strongly Ockham from e onward. Let σ be a solution such that
σ e− σ ′. Set q = δe−(σ, 0) = δe−(σ ′, 0). Let r1, . . . , rk be the times of the successive retractions performed by both
σ and σ ′ along e−. Suppose that Ce(n + 1) 6= ∅.
Case: σ ′ does not retract at e. Then λe(σ ′, 0) ≤ λe(σ, 0) (by Lemmas 10(1) and 12(4)) and λe(σ ′, n + 1) ≤
λe(σ, n + 1) (by Lemmas 11(1) and 13(4)).
Case: σ retracts at e. Then λe(σ ′, 0) ≤ λe(σ, 0) (by Lemmas 10(2) and 12(3)) and λe(σ ′, n + 1) ≤ λe(σ, n + 1)
(by Lemmas 11(2) and 13(3)).
Case: σ ′ retracts at e and σ does not retract at e. Then since σ ′ is stalwart and strongly Ockham from e onward,
σ ′(e−) = σ(e−) = σ(e) is not uniquely simplest at e. Since the problem is nested, σ(e) is not simplest at e. Then
λe(σ
′, 0) < λe(σ, 0) (by Lemmas 10(2) and 12(1)) and λe(σ ′, n + 1) < λe(σ, n + 1) (by Lemmas 11(2) and 13(1)).
a
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Proof of Proposition 3(2). Let σ ′ be a solution that is strongly Ockham and stalwart at every stage. Let σ be a
solution such that σ ′ e− σ ′. Set q = δe−(σ, 0) = δe−(σ ′, 0). Let r1, . . . , rk be the times of the successive retractions
performed by both σ and σ ′ along e−. Suppose that Ce(n + 1) 6= ∅.
Case: σ ′ does not retract at e or σ retracts at e. Same as in preceding proof.
Case: σ ′ retracts at e and σ does not. Then σ(e−) 6= ‘?’ and, since σ ′ is always stalwart and strongly Ockham and
σ ′ retracts at e, it follows that σ ′(e−) = σ(e−) = σ(e) is not uniquely simplest at e. Since σ e− σ ′, e is the first time
at which σ returns an answer that is not uniquely simplest. Then λe(σ ′, 0) < λe(σ, 0) (by Lemmas 10(2) and 12(2))
and λe(σ ′, n + 1) ≤ λe(σ, n + 1) (by Lemmas 11(2) and 13(2)). a
Proof of Proposition 4. Let σ be a solution that violates either Ockham’s razor or stalwartness at e of length
j . There exists σ ′ e− σ such that σ ′ is strongly Ockham and stalwart from e onward (by Lemma 1). Set
q = δe−(σ, 0) = δe−(σ ′, 0). Let r1, . . . , rk be the times of the successive retractions performed by both σ and σ ′
along e−. Suppose that Ce(n + 1) 6= ∅.
Case: σ violates Ockham’s razor at e. Hence, σ(e) is not simplest at e. Then λe(σ ′, 0) < λe(σ, 0) (by Lemmas
10(2) and 12(1)) and λe(σ ′, n + 1) < λe(σ, n + 1) (by Lemmas 11(2) and 13(1)).
Case: σ violates stalwartness at e. So there exists a uniquely simplest answer T at e such that σ(e−) = T
but σ(e) 6= T . Then σ retracts at e but σ ′ does not. So λe(σ ′, 0) < λe(σ, 0) (by Lemmas 10(1) and 12(3)) and
λe(σ
′, n + 1) < λe(σ, n + 1) (by Lemmas 11(1) and 13(3)). a
Proof of Proposition 5. The stalwartness case is immediate from Proposition 4. Now suppose that σ is a solution that
violates the strong Ockham principle (somewhere). Then there exists finite input sequence e compatible with K such
that σ violates the strong Ockham principle at e, but not at any proper sub-sequence of e. Then σ(e) = T , where T
is not the uniquely simplest answer compatible with e. Let j denote the length of e. There exists solution σ ′ e− σ
that is stalwart and strongly Ockham from e onward (by Lemma 1). Set q = δe−(σ, 0) = δe−(σ ′, 0). Let r1, . . . , rk be
the times of the successive retractions performed by both σ and σ ′ along e−. Then λe(σ ′, 0) < λe(σ, 0) (by Lemmas
10(2) and 12(2)). Suppose that Ce(n + 1) 6= ∅.
Case: σ does not retract at e. Then σ(e−) 6= ‘?’, so λe(σ ′, n + 1) < λe(σ, n + 1) (by Lemmas 11(2) and 13(2)).
Case: σ retracts at e. Then λe(σ ′, n + 1) ≤ λe(σ, n + 1) (by Lemmas 11(2) and 13(3)). a
Proof of Corollary 2. (1) implies (2) implies (3) by definition. (3) implies (4) by Proposition 4. (4) implies the strong
Ockham principle and stalwartness since the problem is nested. The strong Ockham principle and stalwartness imply
(1) by Proposition 3(1). a
Proof of Corollary 3. (1) implies (2) by definition. (2) implies (3) by Proposition 5. (3) implies (1) by
Proposition 3(2). a
Appendix B. Lemmas
Lemma 1 (Solution Variants). For each solution σ , e ∈ Kfin, there exists solution σ ′ e− σ such that σ ′ is strongly
Ockham and stalwart from e onward.
Proof. Let σ ′ agree with σ along e and then produce the uniquely simplest answer compatible with e′ if it exists and
‘?’ otherwise, for each e′ properly extending e. Then by construction, σ ′ is stalwart and Ockham from e onward and
σ ′ e− σ . Since (K ,Π ) is strongly Ockham solvable (Axiom 4), σ ′ solves (K ,Π ), because σ ′ converges, in each
world, to whatever the assumed, strongly Ockham solution converges to in that world. a
Lemma 2 (Forcibility is Asymptotic). Let pattern T ∗ b be forcible given e. Then there exists a world w ∈ Ke ∩ T
extending e such that for each finite e′ such that e ≤ e′ < w, T ∗ b is forcible given e′.
Proof. Suppose T ∗ b is forcible given e. Suppose for reductio that the consequent of the lemma is false. Then for
each w ∈ T ∩ Ke there exists e′ extending e and extended by w such that T ∗ b is not forcible given e′. For each
w ∈ T ∩ Ke, let ew be the shortest such e′. Let Πew = {T ∩ Kew : T ∈ Π }. For each ew, T ∗ b is not forcible at ew, so
there exists a solution σw for (Kew ,Π ) that never produces T ∗ b after ew. Let σ solve (K ,Π ) and let σ ∗ be just like
σ except that control is shifted permanently to σw when ew is encountered. So σ ∗ is a solution that never produces
T ∗ b after seeing some ew. Let σ Ď be like σ ∗ except that σ Ď produces ‘?’ along each ew and at each e not extended
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by some ew such that σ returns T at e. Then σ Ď is still a solution, since σ ∗ converges to the truth over Ke ∩ T (the
question marks eventually end in each w ∈ Ke ∩ T ) and over Ke − T (σ does not converge to T in any such world,
so again, the question marks end eventually in each w ∈ Ke − T ). But σ Ď doesn’t produce T ∗ b after e along any e′
extending e. So T ∗ b is not forcible given e. Contradiction. a
Lemma 3 (Forcible Pattern Existence). Suppose that Ce(n) is non-empty. Then there exists a finite pattern b ∈ ∆e
of length ≥ n + 1.
Proof. Let w ∈ Ce(0). In the base case, nature can force the answer T true in w from an arbitrary solution since a
solution must converge to T along w. So (by Axiom 1) there exists some pattern b ∈ ∆e of length ≥ 1. For induction,
suppose that w ∈ Ce(n + 1). Let e′ be the first effect along w after e. So there are n effects occurring along w after
e′. By the induction hypothesis, there exists pattern a ∈ ∆e′ of length at least n + 1. Since e′ is an effect, there exists
pattern T ∗ b such that T ∗ b ∗ a is a pattern in ∆e′− . Hence, T ∗ b ∗ a has length at least n + 2. Since T ∗ b ∗ a is
forcible at e′−, T ∗ b ∗ a is forcible at e as well. So there exists some pattern d ∈ ∆e of which T ∗ b ∗ a is a sub-pattern
(by Axiom 1), so d has length at least n + 2. a
Lemma 4 (Nature’s Starting Point). Let T ∗ b ∈ ∆e. Then there exists w ∈ Ce(0) ∩ T such that for each finite e′
such that e ≤ e′ < w, T ∗ b ∈ ∆e′ .
Proof. Let T ∗ b ∈ ∆e. So T ∗ b is forcible given e. There exists w ∈ Ke ∩ T such that T ∗ b is forcible at each finite
e′ such that e ≤ e′ < w (by Lemma 2). Suppose that T ∗ b is a subpattern of d and T ∗ b 6≤ d and d is forcible at e′.
Then d is forcible at e, so T ∗ b /∈ ∆e, which is a contradiction. Hence, T ∗ b ∈ ∆e′ .
Now suppose for reductio that there exists effect e′ such that e < e′ < w. Then there exists T ′ ∗ c such that
T ′∗c∗∆e′ ⊆ ∆e′− and no member of∆e′− begins with T ′. Recall that T ∗b ∈ ∆e′ , so T ′ 6= T and T ′∗c∗T ∗b ∈ ∆e− .
So since e ≤ e′− < e′, T ′ ∗ c ∗T ∗b is forcible at e. Since T ′ 6= T , it follows that T ∗b 6≤ T ′ ∗ c ∗T ∗b, so T ∗b /∈ ∆e.
Contradiction. So no effect occurs in w after e, so w ∈ Ce(0). a
Lemma 5 (Simple World Existence). Let Ke 6= ∅. Then there exists w ∈ Ce(0).
Proof. Suppose there exists w ∈ Ke. If c(w, e) = 0, we are done. So suppose c(w, e) = k > 0. Then (by Lemma 3)
there exists T ∗ b ∈ ∆e of length k + 1. So by Lemma 4, there exists w′ ∈ Ce(0) ∩ T . a
Lemma 6 (Simplest Answers Forcible First). Let T ∗ b ∈ ∆e. Then T is a simplest answer.
Proof. Suppose that T ∗b ∈ ∆e. Then there existsw ∈ T ∩Ke such that for each e′ for which e ≤ e′ < w, T ∗b ∈ ∆e′
(by Lemma 4). Suppose for reductio that T is not a simplest answer at e. Then for each w′ ∈ T ∩ Ke, c(w′, e) > 0, so
c(w, e) > 0. Hence, there exists effect e′ such that e < e′ < w. Hence, there exists T ′ ∗c such that T ′ ∗c∗∆e′ ⊆ ∆e′− .
Since T ∗ b ∈ ∆e′ , T ′ ∗ c ∗ T ∗ b ∈ ∆e′− . Hence, T ′ ∗ c ∗ T ∗ b is forcible at e. So T ∗ b 6≤ T ′ ∗ c ∗ T ∗ b (by Axiom 2).
Hence, T ∗ b is not backwards-maximally forcible at e, so T ∗ b /∈ ∆e. Contradiction. a
Lemma 7 (Uniquely Simplest Answer and Forcibility). Let answer T ∈ Π be uniquely simplest at e. Then each
pattern in ∆e begins with T .
Proof. Suppose that for some answer T ′ 6= T , pattern T ′ ∗ a ∈ ∆e. So (by Lemma 6), T ′ is simplest at e. So T is not
uniquely simplest. a
Lemma 8 (Simplest Answer Defeated Only by Effects). Let Ke 6= ∅, let e be non-empty, and let answer T ∈ Π be
uniquely simplest at e− but not at e. Then e is an effect.
Proof. Let Ke, e be non-empty. Then Ke− is non-empty, so (by Lemma 5) Ce−(0),Ce(0) are non-empty. So since T
is uniquely simplest at e− but not at e, we have Ce−(0) ⊆ T but Ce(0) 6⊆ T . So there exists w ∈ Ce(0) − Ce−(0).
Hence, c(w, e−) > 0 and c(w, e) = 0, so e is an effect. a
Lemma 9 (Sequential Forcing). Let e be a finite input sequence and let pattern a = (T1, . . . , Tk) ∈ ∆e and let i be
a natural number and let 1 ≤ m ≤ k. Then there exists w ∈ Ce(m − 1) ∩ Tm and e′ such that e < e′ < w and:
(1) for each m′ ≤ m, σ produces Tm′ at least i times in immediate succession after e along e′ and
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(2) exactly m − 1 effects occur along e′ after e and
(3) for each e′′ such that e′ ≤ e′′ < w, (Tm, . . . , Tk) ∈ ∆e′′ .
Proof. In the base case, let m = 1. Let i be arbitrary. There exists w ∈ Ce(0) ∩ T1 such that for all e′ such that
e ≤ e′ < w, (T1, . . . , Tk) ∈ ∆e′ (by Lemma 4). Since w ∈ T1 and σ is a solution, σ converges to T1 in w and, hence,
produces T1 at least i times after e, say by e′ such that e < e′ < w. Since w ∈ Ce(0) and e′ < w, no effects occur
along e′ after e.
In the inductive case, let 1 < m ≤ k. By the induction hypothesis, there exists w ∈ Ce(m − 1)∩ Tm−1 and e0 such
that e < e0 < w and:
(1) for each m′ ≤ m − 1, σ produces Tm′ at least i times in immediate succession after e along e0 and
(2) exactly m − 2 effects occur along e0 after e and
(3) for each e′ such that e0 ≤ e′ < w, (Tm−1, . . . , Tk) ∈ ∆e′ .
There exists e1 > e0 such that exactly one effect occurs along e1 after e0 and (Tm, . . . , Tk) ∈ ∆e1 (by Axiom 3).
There exists w′ ∈ Ce1(0)∩ Tm such that for each e′ such that e1 ≤ e′ < w′, (Tm, . . . , Tk) ∈ ∆e′ (by Lemma 4). Since
w′ ∈ Tm , there exists e2 such that e1 < e2 < w′ and solution σ produces Tm at least i times along e2 after e. Then
m − 1 effects occur after e along e0, one effect occurs along e1 after e0 and no effects occur along w′ after e1 since
w′ ∈ Ce1(0). Hence, w′ ∈ Ce(m − 1). So w′, e2 have the required properties at level m. a
Lemma 10 (Upper Bound Over Ce(0)). Let Ke 6= ∅, let e have length j , and let solution σ be stalwart and strongly
Ockham from e onward. Let (r1, . . . , rk) be the timed retractions of σ along e−. Set q = δe−(σ, 0). Then
λe(σ, 0) ≤
{
1. (q, (r1, . . . , rk)) if σ does not retract at e;
2. (q, (r1, . . . , rk, j)) in general.
Proof. Suppose that w ∈ Ce(0), where e has length j . Let (r1, . . . , rk) be the retraction times for both σ and σ ′ along
e−. Also, σ ′ produces only the uniquely simplest answer compatible with experience or ‘?’ and never retracts it along
w from e onward ( Lemma 8), so σ ′ produces no false answers along w from the end of e onward. So if σ does not
retract at e, then:
λ(σ,w) ≤ (q, (r1, . . . , rk)).
In the general case, σ may retract at e:
λ(σ,w) ≤ (q, (r1, . . . , rk, j)).
Since w is an arbitrary element of Ce(0),
λe(σ, 0) ≤ λ(σ,w). a
Lemma 11 (Upper Bound Over Ce(n + 1)). Let e have length j , and let solution σ be stalwart and strongly Ockham
from e onward. Let (r1, . . . , rk) be the timed retractions of σ along e−. Then
λe(σ, n + 1) ≤
{
1. (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, ω(n+1))) if σ does not retract at e;
2. (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, k, ω(n+1))) in general.
Proof. Since σ retracts at most once at each effect from e (by Lemma 8), then even if σ retracts at e:
λe(σ, n + 1) ≤ (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, j, ω(n+1))).
If σ does not retract at e:
λe(σ, n + 1) ≤ (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, ω(n+1))). a
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Lemma 12 (Lower Bound Over Ce(0)). Let Ke 6= ∅ and let e have length j . Let (r1, . . . , rk) be the timed retractions
of solution σ along e−. Set q = δe−(σ, 0). Then
λe(σ, 0) ≥

1. (q + 1, (r1, . . . , rk, j + 1)) if σ(e) is not simplest at e;
2. (q, (r1, . . . , rk, j + 1)) if σ(e) is not uniquely simplest at e;
3. (q, (r1, . . . , rk, j)) if σ retracts at e;
4. (q, (r1, . . . , rk)) in general.
Proof. (1) Suppose that T = σ(e) is not simplest at e. Hence, Ce(0) ∩ T = ∅. Let w ∈ C0(e) be such that
δe(σ,w) = δe(σ, 0). Then w /∈ T , so σ commits at least e(σ,w)+ 1 errors in w. Since σ is a solution, σ converges
to T ′ ∈ w, so there exists some e′ such that e < e′ < w and σ(e′) 6= T . Hence,
λe(σ, 0) ≥ λ(σ,w) ≥ (q + 1, (r1, . . . , rk, j + 1)).
(2) Suppose that σ does not retract at e and e is least such that answer σ(e) is not uniquely simplest at e. Let
D = σ(e). So there exists w ∈ Ce(0)− D. Since σ is a solution, there exists e′ such that e < e′ < w and σ(e′) = Tw,
so σ retracts along w no sooner than stage j+1. Also, since δe(σ, 0) = d there exists w′ ∈ Ce(0) in which σ commits
d errors after e along w′. Hence,
λe(σ, 0) ≥ λ(σ,w) ≥ (q, (r1, . . . , rk, j + 1)).
(3) Suppose that σ retracts at e. There exists w ∈ Ce (by Lemma 5), so choose w ∈ Ce(0) so that σ commits
q = δe(σ,w) errors along e− in w. The retractions by σ along e− get counted along with the retraction at e. Hence:
λe(σ, 0) ≥ λ(σ,w) ≥ (q, (r1, . . . , rk, j + 1)).
(4) In general, simply drop the retraction at j from the argument in case (3). a
Lemma 13 (Lower Bound Over Ce(n + 1)). Let Ce(n + 1) be non-empty, let e have length j . Let (r1, . . . , rk) be the
timed retractions of solution σ along e−. Then
λe(σ, n + 1) ≥

1. (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, j + 1, ω(n+1))) if σ(e) is not simplest at e
2. (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, j + 1, ω(n+1))) if e is least such that
σ(e−) 6= ‘?’ and
σ(e) is not uniquely simplest at e
3. (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, j, ω(n+1))) if σ retracts at e;
4. (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, ω(n+1))) in general.
Proof. Suppose that Ce(n+ 1) 6= ∅. There exists pattern T ∗ T ′ ∗ d ∈ ∆e of length n+ 2 (by Lemma 3). Let arbitrary
natural number i be given. There exists w0 ∈ Ce(0) ∩ T such that for each e′ such that e ≤ e′ < w, T ∗ T ′ ∗ d ∈ ∆e′
(by Lemma 4).
(1) σ(e) is not a simplest answer at e. Hence, w0 /∈ σ(e). So since σ is a solution, σ eventually converges to the
true answer T in w0, so there exists e0 such that e < e0 < w and σ produces T successively at least i times along e0
after the end of e and σ retracts σ(e) back to T no sooner than stage j+1. Pattern T ∗T ′ ∗d ∈ ∆e0 . So (by Lemma 9)
there exists wn+1 ∈ Ce0(n + 1) along which each answer occurring in T ′ ∗ d is repeated by σ at least i times after
the end of e0. Since T 6= T ′, σ commits at least i errors along wn+1 after the end of e0. Since e0 < w0 ∈ Ce(0), no
effects occur in e0 after the end of e. So since wn+1 ∈ Ce0(n + 1), wn+1 ∈ Ce(n + 1). Hence,
λ(σ,wn+1) ≥ (i, (r1, . . . , rk, j + 1, j + 1+ i, j + 1+ 2i, . . . , j + 1+ (n + 1)i))).
Since i is arbitrary,
λe(σ, n + 1) ≥ λ(σ,wn+1) ≥ (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, j + 1, ω(n+1))).
(2) Suppose that σ(e−) 6= ‘?’ and e is least such that σ(e) is not uniquely simplest at e. Let D = σ(e). So there
exists w ∈ Ce(0)− D. Case: σ(e−) = D. Then D is uniquely simplest at e−. Hence, w /∈ Ce−(0). So e is an effect in
w. So there exists pattern G ∗ g such that G ∗ g ∗∆e ⊆ ∆e− . Since the uniquely simplest hypothesis D at e− begins
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each pattern in ∆e− (by Lemma 7), G = D, so D ∗ g ∗∆e ⊆ ∆e− . So (by Axiom 2) no pattern in ∆e begins with D.
Hence, D is not even simplest given e. Revert to case (1). Case: σ(e−) 6= D. Then σ retracts at e. Revert to case (3).
(3) σ retracts at e. Since T ∗ T ′ ∗ b ∈ ∆e and the length of T ∗ T ′ ∗ b is at least n+ 2, it follows (by Lemma 9) that
there exists wn+1 ∈ Ce(n + 1) along which each answer occurring in T ∗ T ′ ∗ b is repeated by σ at least i times after
the end of e. Since T 6= T ′, σ commits at least i errors along wn+1 after the end of e. Hence,
λ(σ,wn+1) ≥ (i, (r1, . . . , rk, j, j + 1i, j + 2i, . . . , j + (n + 1)i)).
Since i > j + 1 is arbitrary,
λe(σ, n + 1) ≥ (ω, (r1, . . . , rk, j, ω(n+1))).
(4) general case. Follow case 3, ignoring the retraction at j . a
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